RECENT CASES
be deprived of their privilege of electing the majority of the board of directors Only by
the following procedures: (i) by redemption of prior preference stock below $io,ooo,ooo, in which event the shareholder would be entitled to receive $iio per share redeemed; (2) by purchase of a like amount of stock out of sinking fund moneys; (3) by
amendment of the charter. The first two methods deal with acquisition of prior preference shares and since they are the only methods provided for by which the prior preference shares could be retired, the court concluded, that the enumeration of certain
methods excluded the power of the corporation to purchase under any other. The
court acceded to the general rule permitting purchase 'of a corporation's own shares
out of surplus; Boggs v. Fleming et al., 66 F. (2d) 859 (C.C.A. 4th 1933), affg. In re
Boggs-Rice Co., 4 F. Supp. 431 (D.C.Va. 1933); Kennerly v. Columbia Chemical Co.,
137 Va. 240, rig S.E. 265 (X923); but decided that the principal case fell within the
exception that such may not be done where "substantial rights of the stockholders"
would be adversely affected. Pricev. PineMountain Iron & Coal Co., 32 S.W. 267 (Ky.
x895); Murphy Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Skaggs, 67 Utah 487, 248 Pac. 127 (1926). See
Gipson v. Bedard, 173 Minn. 104, 217 N.W. 139 (1927). The court, moreover, referred
to a "substantial right," implied by the charter, prohibiting purchases except for permanent retirement and out of sinking fund moneys. The existence of the retirement
and sinking fund provisions would seem a weak basis for this implication.
Another argument sustaining the conclusion of the court is that the clause, conferring the right to elect a majority of the directors "so long as the prior preference
stock outstanding shall be in excess of $ro,oooooo," does not contemplate that the
election rights shall be suspended during the time that the corporation holds the shares.
But see Walsh v. State, 199 Ala. 123, 74 So. 45 (1917); Ruffner v. Sophie Mae Candy
Corp., 35 Ga. App. 114, 132 S.E. 396 (1926). If this viewpoint is correct, treasury
shares must be considered "outstanding" for the purpose of the clause, which is contrary to the generally accepted meaning of the word "outstanding." Borg v. International Silver Co., ii F. (2d) 147 (C.C.A. 2d 1925).
Furthermore, a reasonable construction would seem to be one giving to the word
"outstanding" its usual meaning as not including treasury shares, and also to construe
the words "so long as" to mean "so long as and whenever." This construction would
negative the right of the prior preference preferred stock to control the board of directors as long as the shares are held in the treasury, and would seem to leave little basis
for the court's implication that the charter provision limited the power of the corporation to acquire prior preference shares.
The management, elected by prior preference shareholders, is apparently trying to
get the benefit of reducing the outstanding prior preference shares at a favorable price
while preserving their control of the corporation.
Elections-Constitutional Law-Conviction of Felony as Disqualification from
Office-[North Dakota].-Defendant, governor of North Dakota, was convicted of a
felony in the Federal court. On quo warranto proceedings to remove him from office
the state court held, that although an appeal was pending and the offense was only a
misdemeanor under the state statutes, the defendant was under a disability to hold
office since the constitution required the governor to be a qualified elector and provided
that any person "convicted of felony unless restored to civil rights" was not qualified
to vote. State ex rel. Olson, v. Langer, 256 N.W. 377 (N.D. 1934).
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In determining whether the constitutional disqualification contemplates conviction
for a felony anywhere, gr merely conviction for a crime which is a felony within the
state, a question of statutory construction is presented, in which the result reached in
similar and analagous situations is relevant. Where conviction of a felony or infamous
crime is made a disqualification for public office, conviction in another state is usually
held insufficient, although the offense is also a felony under the law of the former. Hildreth v. Heath, x Ill. App. 82 (1878); State ex rel. Mitchell v. McDonald, 164 Miss. 405,
145 So. 5o8 (1933). Contra: Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360 (1923),
cert. denied, 267 U.S. 575 (1925); State ex rel. Anderson v. Fousek, 91 Mont. 448, 8 P(2d) 791 (1932); and see, State ex rel. Beckman v. Bowman, 38 Ohio App. 237, 175 N.E.
891 (1930). Conviction under the laws of another jurisdiction will not disqualify a
juror, Queenan v. Territory of Oklahoma, iii Okla. 261, 71 Pac. 218 (igoi), nor render
an executor incompetent, Gariteev. Bond, 102 Md. 379, 62 AUt. 631 (1905). The established rule is that conviction in another jurisdiction will not render a witness incompetent to testify. Loganv. U.S., 144 U.S. 263 (1892); Browmt V. U.S., 233 Fed. 353 (C.C.A.
6th 1916); Commonwealth v. Green, 16 Mass. 515 (1822); Sims v. Sims, 75 N.Y.
466 (1878); 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923), § 522; cf. Roxen v. U.S., 245 U.S. 467
(1917); Jones, Evidence (2d ed. 19o8), §§ 716,717. The courts contrary to the principal
case rely on the cases involving the competency of witnesses. The instant case bases
its decision on cases involving disbarment of attorneys and revocation of medical
licenses where conviction in any jurisdiction is held sufficient. In re Minner, 133 Kan.
789, 3 P. (2d) 473 (1931); In re Peters,73 Mont. 284, 235 Pac. 772 (1925); Seitz v. Ohio
State Medical Board, 24 Ohio App. 154, 157 N.E. 304 (1926); contra: In re Ebbs, 15o
N.C. 44, 63 S.E. 19o (19o8). And this is the rule even though the offense is not a felony
by local law. Matter of Lindheim, 195 App. Div. 827, 189 N.Y. S. 211 (1921); In
re Ackerson, 218 App. Div. 388, 218 N.Y. S. 654 (1926); 79 A.L.R. 38 (i931). The
latter group of cases is distinguishable in that the courts without any statute have inherent control over attorneys. InreEgan,22 S.D. 355,117 N.W. 874 (19o8). And medical boards can revoke licenses as an exercise of the police power. Meffert v. State Board
of Medical Registration, 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247 (19o3), affd. 195 U.S. 625 (1904);
Lawrence v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 239 Mass. 424, 132 N.E. 174 (1921). In
the instant case the disqualification as to voting seems to be a matter which is purely
internal and so the court might well have required the conviction to be for a felony
within the state, or at least for an act which is considered a felony by local law. As a
matter of draftsmanship, it would seem desirable to have a stricter rule of disqualification for holding office so that it would be possible to have a result similar to the disbarment cases, but the constitution here involved merely made disqualification for
office depend on ability to vote.
A verdict of guilty without an entry of judgment is not a conviction within the
meaning of the type of provision here considered. People v. Fabian,192 N.Y. 443, 85
N.E. 672 (19o8). There must be a judgment entered on the verdict. Smith v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 589, i13 S.E. 707 (1922); State ex rel. Blake v. Levi, 1og W.Va. 277, 153
S.E. 587 (193o); and see Donnell v. Board of Registrationof Medicine, 128 Me. 523, 149
AUt. 153 (1930). A presumption of guilt then arises, and the disqualification exists
although an appeal is pending and a certificate of reasonable doubt has been issued.
McKannay v. Horton, i51 Cal. 711, 91 Pac. 598 (1907); In re Obergfell, 239 N.Y. 48,
145 N.E. 323 (1924). Cf. In re Advisory Opinionto the Governor, 75 Fla. 674, 78 So. 673
(1918). See 24 A.L.R. 1290 (1922).

